http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-01-261113.html
Afghan spies take fight to IslamabadBy Shahab Jafry
The
November 1 drone attack that killed Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the TTP
or Pakistani Taliban) leader Hakimullah Mehsud, and the subsequent
appointment of Mullah Fazlullah in his place, was an Afghan intelligence
maneuver aimed at "ending the talk of talks" and recommitting the TTP
to its insurgency, Pakistani counterinsurgency officials have revealed
on condition of anonymity.
Chatter about possible TTP collusion
with the NDS (Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security), long a
concern for Pakistani intelligence, was not taken seriously till the New
York Times' October 28 account of a US special forces raid on an Afghan
intelligence convoy carrying Hakimullah's number two, Lateef
Mehsud, as he was headed for secret talks in Kabul. [1]
Kabul's vendetta wars"The
NYT story was not new information", said Pakistani intelligence
officials who refused to be named. "We, and the Americans, have known
this for a long time".
Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI) believes that Fazlullah's track record made him the most
convenient conduit for this arrangement. His group joined the TTP amid
the chaos following the July 2007 Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation,
which sparked unprecedented militant attacks and marked a major turning
point in the insurgency. He portrayed the operation, along with drone
attacks, as proof that Pakistan was playing into US hands in the garb of
a war against terror.
When his parallel sharia courts and
public beheadings provoked military action in the Swat Valley in 2009,
he was pushed into the Kunar-Nooristan mountain range across the Afghan
border, from where he has continued to mount attacks inside Pakistan.
These included the September 15 assassination of General Officer
Commanding for Malakand Division General Sanaullah Niazi, Lieutenant
colonel Tauseef Ahmed and Lance Naik Irfanullah. (Lance Naik is the
equivalent rank to lance corporal in the Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indian
Armies). [2]
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces
abandoned the Kunar-Nooristan area in mid-2009 after repeated attempts
to secure the border, and it was here, according to tribal sources, that
Fazlullah's association with the NDS matured. The accompanying
photograph, obtained from an information source in the tribal area,
allegedly shows the NDS deputy director Kunar, Ghafoor (far right),
holding talks with two Fazlullah group commanders for Kunar region. This
is the first time such evidence has been presented in the international
media.
Pakistan's
intelligence officials say the NDS is not acting alone, but is rather
the lynch pin of a deeper proxy network involving Indian and even
American intelligence agencies. That is why the NYT story's novelty was
not so much in its content but its timing.
"If you look at it
closely, you'll see the insurgency here suiting the Americans. The more
the militants are engaged in Pakistan, the less hurdles the Americans
face wrapping up in Afghanistan", said the intelligence officials.
"In
Hakimullah's case, it was pretty clear that those who invested large
sums in arming the TTP would not allow it to submit to a negotiated
settlement. It makes no sense for the handlers, except in buying time
for it to re-arm".
A typical security concern in such operations
is fear of the proxy going rogue, or offering too much during talks
with the enemy. Lateef's interrogation revealed doubts over Hakimullah,
it is believed in Pakistan's covert networks.
Isolated and
paranoid, and besieged by commanders urging talks, there were concerns
that Hakimullah might spill a few beans about his patrons in exchange
for concessions - hence the hellfire missiles.
"Why do you think
they always know just where to find the man that matters most at the
time with regard to peace initiatives?" they asked. "From Nek Mohammed
to Baitullah Mehsud to Molvi Nazir to Waliur Rehman to now Hakimullah,
there is definitely a pattern that cannot be ignored".
The hit
allowed the US to score political points at home and replace Hakimullah
with Fazlullah, and gave the NDS greater leverage in the Pakistani
theatre.
The timing is seen as a warning for Pakistan from
Kabul: As the US leaves, Afghans will not shy away from using the same
dirty tactics they have long accused Islamabad of - such as offering
their territory to launch cross-border operations and arming and funding
militant proxies. The Indians, meantime, can wear down Pakistan's
military in an internal fight, while keeping it engaged on the western
border.
Such a "mutually beneficial relationship" as another
Afghan official is quoted as describing the arrangement, has deeper
implications that have not been explained. Despite a measured public
alliance, the TTP and Afghanistan's Taliban have been at loggerheads for
some time.
The Pakistani reaction has not helped clarify
matters. Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar was livid at the Hakimullah
strike, accusing the US of "sabotaging the peace process". [3] An
official visit to the tribal areas to formally deliver the talks offer,
he said, would no longer go ahead. The northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province's government threatened to block NATO supply routes if drone
strikes were not called off by November 20.
Yet the Taliban
publicly denied any contact with the government, exposing the home
minister's antics as "not so smart face-saving", according to Rasheed
Safi, head of news at Radio Burraq, a trusted news source across the
northern areas.
Despite its open opposition to drone strikes,
the federal government is not likely to support the threats of the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has already
ruled out upsetting ties with the US, despite Nisar's remarks.
What about the talks?Strangely,
Islamabad seems completely unfazed by TTP's rejection of peace talks
and promise of revenge attacks targeting Sharif's family and senior
party members. The military and other security personnel, not to mention
minorities, are, of course, fair game as well. Still, the center
continues are posturing for peace, while center-right parties insist
only drone attacks are preventing negotiations.
The military, on
the other hand, seems to have interpreted recent events more
profoundly. For TTP's patrons in Kabul and Delhi, Fazlullah brings the
double advantage of not only being physically closer to his handlers,
but also boasting a network with greater penetration in settled areas.
While
senior Pakistani officers realize the inevitability of talks, they
stress the right approach is first cutting off the insurgents' lifeline,
which means disrupting their foreign funds and arms. Without isolating
the TTP, talks can never be approached form a position of strength.
But
so far neither the government nor the military has succeeded in
exposing the TTP's plans. Fazlullah is very good at influencing public
opinion. As TTP chief of Swat, he bombarded traditionally conservative
listeners with Takfiri extremism through illegal radio channels, earning
him the nickname Mullah FM. The TTP is expected to have a far more
aggressive disinformation campaign under Fazlullah, which will engage
the Pakistani government's information machinery, and the military's PR
wing.
For now, though, the country remains bitterly divided. The
uncertainty regarding talks, the constant criticism of the war - to the
point of hardliners openly sympathizing with militants - have left
Pakistan's political, social, military and media circles badly split. If
foreign powers are indeed colluding to help paralyze Islamabad, their
script is playing out well.
